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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah· 
ANEST AGGELOS, 
YS. 
ZELLA MINING ;CoMPANY, a ·COr-
poration of Utah, et al., 
De fendaJn.ts, 
Including Stephen J. Hays, Julia 
Rays H·oge, Mrs. Lou ·Gorey, 
. Mrs. Ethel V. Reilley, Mary 
Louise 0 'Donnell, Lucille Y. 
Hays, as Administratrix of the 
Estate of Lawrence J. Hays, 
deeeased, and S. Hays ·Com-
pany, a cJrporation, 
No. 6217 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
The brief of appellant is a.bout as miscellaneous and 
un-understandahle ~so far as presenting the facts and i~s­
sues in this case is concerned .as the a_bstract which was 
prepared. In the hope tha.t we ~ay assist the c-ourt in 
understanding what this case is all wborut, we shall re-
state the facts as disclosed by the evidence. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
ST,ATE~IE·NT OF F'ACT·S. 
Mineral Entry No. 21~4 designated by the surveyor 
general as ·Lot No. 118, known throughout these prnceed-
ings as Clays Placer Mining ·Claim, is owned by defend-
ants Zelia Mining Company, a corporation, (3/4ths) and 
S. Hays ·Company (1/4th). :Lt is located in the West 
Mountain Mining District Salt Lake County, Utah, other-
wise known as Bingham Canyon, below town. The 
abstract, Exhibit 2, \vas i·ntrodueed in evidence. 
Defendants introduced in evidence tax receipts show-
ing payments of taxes by tthem and their predeees·sors in 
interest from the year 1917 to and including the year 1938 
(see Exhibits 1 and 6.) ' The assessments were m.ade 
under the heading ''Real Es ta:te'' and '' P·a tented Mining 
C'laims ", and covered a one-fourth interest and three-
fourths interest respectively in "'Clays Placer (11'8) ", 
and also described under another heading as ''Bingham 
Placers''. 
It was stipulated (Tr. 103-104) that the assessments 
of this -claim were as paid by defendants made by the 
State ·Tax C:ommission after its .organization in 19'31. 
Plaintiff Aggelos has been living on a portion of the 
property for a number of years. There are two small 
houses on it, one of which, a four room frame house, was 
built in 1927 hy plaintiff, and at the same time he built a 
garage. There was a fence on three sides of an area sur-
rounding these houses, but the fences were torn down by 
plaintiff about two years before the action was br,ought 
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(Ab. 27), at w·hich time the ground was filled in with 
dirt to the depth of about six feet. 
The county assess-or of Salt Lake ·C.ounty for a nunl-
ber of years prior to and including the year 1927 made 
purported as-sessmentg in :the name of plaintiff under the 
heading ''real estate'' in the following language : '' Im-
provements on Clays Placer'', which were paid by plain-
tiff. In 1928 there was a purported assessment by the 
county assessor in the name of plaintiff in the following 
language: ''Improvements on Clays Placer, Copperton, 
Bingham Canyon, below town.'' ( Tr. 142, 143) This 
amount was paid by plaintiff Novemher 29, 1928. 
In 1929 the assessor -of Salt Lake County made a 
pur.p·orted assessment in the name of plaintiff under th·e 
heading, "Improvements on ~Clays Placer, ~Copperton, 
;Bingham Canyon, below town''. This was eha·nged in red 
ink to read, ''Real E~sta.te and Improvements''. This 
was nort paid. ( Tr. 142, 143) 
In 1930 is a purported assessment by the county as-
sess-or of .Salt Lake County in the name of plai·ntiff under 
the heading, ''Improvements on Clays Pla~cer, Copperton, 
Bingham ·Canyon, below town'', then a change in red ink 
by writing above that description, "R. E. and''. This 
was not paid. (Tr. 143, 144) 
In 1931 the as.sessor of Salrt Lake County made a pur-
portea assessment in the name. of plaintiff under the 
heading ''Real E-state and i..mprovements on Clays 
Pla!cer, Co.p·perton, Bin~ham Canyon, fbelow town.'' ( Tr. 
145, 146) ·This was not paid. 
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In 1932 ('Tr. 146, 147) the County A:sjs-essor of Salt 
L~ake Q.ounty made a purported asses.sment, '·'·Real Etatte 
and Improvements on Clays Plaicer, Copperton, Bingham 
:Canyon, below town'', in the name of plaintiff. This was 
not pafd. 
In 1933 the county assessor of Salt Lake County 
made a purported assessment in the name of plaintiff 
under the des-cription '·'Real Estate and Improvements 
on Clays P.la.cer, c·opperton, Bingham ·Canyon, below 
tow·n''. This was not paid. 
:rn 19'34 the county assessor of S-alt Lake County 
made a purported ass-essment in the name of plaintiff 
under the des-cription ''Real 'Eistate and Improvement·s 
;on ·C'lay:s Pla:cer, Copperton, Bingham Ca:nyon, below 
town". Paid De·cember 20, 1934, (Tr. 147) 
In 1935 1the c-ounty assessor of Salt Lake County 
made a purported assessment under the descripti.on, 
''Real Estate and Improvements on ~clays PlaJcer, Cop-
perton, Bi·ngham Canyon, below town''. Paid January 
7,. 19·36. ('Tr. 148) 
In 19;3·6 the county assess-or of Salt Lake C'ounty 
made a purported ass-essment in the name of plaintiff 
under the description ''Real ESttate and Improvements 
on ·C1ays Placer, Cop.perton, Bingha~ Canyon, below 
town''. P:aid December 21, 1'9a6. (Tr. 149) 
In 1g.37 the ·county assessor of Salt L~ake County 
made a purported assessment in the name of plaintiff 
under the description ''Real Estate and Improvements 
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on ·Clays Placer, C·opperton, Bing·ham ·Canyon, below 
town''. Paid December 20, 1g.37. 
~On May 26, 19·36 plaintiff paid to the Treasurer of 
Salt Lake Colmty the sum of $143.2-5 and re-eeived a. 
receipt '' suhject to approval of ·C.ounty ·C'ommissioners 
to be acc.epted for quit-claim deed to the following prop-
erty: '' R .. E. and Impr. on Clays Placer, Cop.p·erton, 
Bingham ·Canyon, below tow·n' ', representing purp·orted 
delinquent taxes for t1:he years 19·29, 1930, 19'31, 1'9·32 and 
19~33. Thereafter on the first day of June, 19-36 there 
was .a deed, E'xhibit ''A'', from Salt Lake County to 
plaintiff, ·purporting to convey to the plaintiff all of the 
title of the state, eounty, and of eaeh eity, town, Stchool 
and other taxing districts in the "following described tract 
of land in Salt Lake County, ~State of Utah: ''R. E·. and 
Imps. on Clays Placer, ·C'opperton, Bingham Canyon, 
below town ''. 
It was testified by the deputy county treasurer that 
the initials "R. E.'' means real e~tate (Tr. 1151) and 
''Imp." means improvements. The description of the 
property taxed '' R. E. and Imp. on ·Clays Placer'', et·c., 
appears under the general heading "Real Estate'' in the 
assessor's re·cord. (Tr. 150) 
D·eputy ~County Assessor Matilda Gerrar~d testified 
·(Tr. 161) that this was a general assessment made under 
the design·ation "Real Estate". 
Plaintiff testified that in 1919 he paid James Kora.bes 
and William Pappas $1500.00, at which time no paper was 
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made out. No evidence was given as to the conversations 
~that were had ·Or the legal effect of that tra:nsaction. The 
c.ourt sustained objections to the attempted testimony of 
legal eonclusions. 
Plaintiff brought suit on July 20, 1937 to quiet title 
to a portion of the surface of the Clays Placer Mining 
Claim, Lot 118, as described in paragraph IX of the 
complaint, and alleged ownership and possession in him-
self for more than seven years prior to commencement 
of the action, that the premises were enclosed on three 
sides by a good substantial fence, and that for more 
than seventeen years he had paid all the taxes lawfully 
levied upon the premises. 
These allegations were denied by defendants, and 
as .an affirmative defense ·defendants alleged that they 
and their prede,c:essora in interest had paid all taxes upon 
the property for upwards of twenty years. 
The court found that defendants were the owners of 
the mining elaim and the who~le of it; that plaintiff for 
approximately sev~nteen years has been in possession 
and ·Oecupancy of a portion of the mining ·claim and has 
made ·certain improvements thereon, but that such oc-
eupancy and possession was without title or claim .of 
title; that plaintiff never at any time or at all, and part-
icularly during the s·even years prior to the commence-
ment of the action, paid any taxes lawfully levied a11d as-
sessed upon the premises ; thwt for many years prior to 
. 
the ·commencement of the action, and particularly during 
the seven years immediately prior thereto, defendants 
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paid taxes levied and assessed on the premises by the 
State Board of Equalization, \Y hich taxes "rere levied, 
assessed and covered ~the lands and premises in question, 
and the \vhole thereof. The court further found tha.t the 
possession and ·oe.cupancy by plaintiff wa.s in subordina-
tion to the leg-al title of defendants. 
From these findings of fact the trial eourt concluded 
tthat plaintiff hiad ·not held ·Or possessed the premises ad-
versely to the leg·ai title and was not entitled to a. decree 
quieting title, and thereup.on ordered the a.ction dismissed 
"\Yith prejudice. 
Plaintiff assigns as error the making of these find-
ings of fact, conclusio-ns of law and de,cree. 
Att the outset it is \veil to hear in mind a few funda-
mental .propositions to which we will direct the court's 
attention before considering the sufficien·cy of the evi-
dence. 
I. 
Persons claiming by adverse use have the burden of 
proving each and every element. necessary to state their 
elaim, and all doubts are resolved against su.ch adverse 
claimants. 
1 American Jurisprudence 926, Section 237, ''Ad-
verse P·ossession'' : 
'·'In accordance with the familiar rule that the 
burd·en of proof rests on him who has the affirma-
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tive of an issue, the party relying on a title by 
adverse possession has the- burden of proving all 
the fa.cts necessary to e.stablis:h su-ch a. title.'' 
Sprimg Creek Irriga.tion Comparny v. z.oUinger, 58 
Utah 90. ·8ee numerous ·Cases ·cited under Section 104-2-
7, Revised :Statutes of Utah. 
'' (S·ec. '585) A. Burden ·Of Proof-1. As to 
Adverse Possession. The burden of proving ad-
verse possession is in all cases upon him who sets 
it up and relies ·On it. 'All presumptions are in 
favor of the legal holder, aTid the burden of over-
.eoming them rests wirth him who assails the legal 
title'. The claimant must show every element nec-
essary to ·c.onstitute a title under the statute of 
limitations, and if he fails 1to do so it is the duty 
·Of the ·court to instruct the jury that there is not 
sufficient evidence to ·entitle him to reeover. Thus 
.he must show tha!t the pos.session was actual, open 
and notorious, continuous, for the full time re-
quired by the statute, ·exclusive, hostile and under 
a ·Claim of right. S·o, if payment of taxes is made 
an element of title by adverse possession by stat-
U!te, the burden of proof is upon the party s·etting 
up adverse possession to show such payment, and 
thus bring himself within the terms of the act. 
The ,claimant hy adverse posse.ssion als·o has the 
burden of showing the ·extent of his possession, 
and he must show an advers·e occupancy of a de-
finite area sufficiently described on Wihi·ch to found 
a verdict. '' 
In adverse ti1tle suits poss·ession is presumed to he 
in the person having legal title, and the occupation of the 
property .by others is deem~d to be under and in subordi-
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nation to. the legal title, unless it a.ppear,s that the prop-
erty has been held and adversely possessed for seven 
years before the commencement of the action. Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 104-2-7. 
It is uncontradicted in this case that plaintiff is not 
relying upon a. "\Yritten instrument as the basis for any 
adverse pos,session. Under the pr:ovisions of ,Se~ction 
104-2-10 of our Revised Statutes any such action must be 
under claim of title. Many States do not require adverse 
possession to be couple-d with elaim of title. :Such is not 
the case in the State of Utah. While under .our statute 
a writing is not ne.c.essary to estaiblish the claim of title, 
irt is nevertheless nec.essary that posession be taken under 
claim of title. There is no evidence in this case of any 
such purported claim of title. 
In addition it is necessary that the property must 
have been protected by a substantial e-nclosure. R.evised 
Statutes .of Utah 104-2-11. 
Also :such adverse -claimant must establish that he 
and his predecessors in interest and grantors have paid 
all taxes which have been levied and assessed up·on such 
land acco:vding to law. Revised Statutes of Utah, 104-
2-12. 
We .shall first discuss and consider whether plaintiff 
established by any evidence that he ha.d paid all taxes 
lawfully assessed. 
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(Assignments of Error 2 and 3.) 
Appellant states under these assignments that the 
unc.ontradicted evidence shows plaintiff to have paid all 
taxes lawfully assessed, and that the finding of fact that 
defendants had paid all taxes lawfully assessed was in 
error. 
The facts upon whieh these alleged errors exist have 
been heretofore :set forth. 
Under, the provisions of the ·Constitution of U~tah, 
Article XIII, Section 4 and Section 11, and under the 
,provisions of Se-ctions 80-5-3, 80-5-55, and 80-5-56, an 
mines and mining claims are 1to be assessed by the State 
·Tax ~Commission, both as to surface and suh-surface 
rights. All other property is, under the pliovisions of 
Sectiion 80-5-3, assessed by the eounty assessors. In the 
presenee of that ~c'Onstitutional provision and those pro-
visions ·of our sta1tute, it is difficult to see how plaintiff 
·can suecessfully claim that the purported taxes paid by 
him were lawfully assessed, .si~nce it is undisputed in the 
evidence that the property involved is mining pr-operty 
and should be assessed by the State Tax Commission. 
Any assessment .of mining property ihy the county 
assessor as to ·either surfa-ce or suJb.-surfa,ce rights is an 
illegal assessment and does not constitute the payment 
all of taxes which shall have been levied and assessed 
·according to law as required by our statute. 
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This court ha.s held tha.t a.n adverse title cannot he 
based and founded upon the payment of any -such illegal-
ly assessed taxes. 
In the .case of Ri.o Gra;nd-e Western, Railroad c·om-
pany v. Salt Lake I'nvestment Company, 3'5 Utah 528, the 
railroad .eompany \Yas attempting to sustain adve;rse 
possession 11pon .the basis of taxes levied by the S;tate 
Board of Equalization upon a lot adj.oini·ng, but not a 
part of, its railroad right of way. At that time the State 
Board of E:qua.lization assessed railroad property and 
the railroad company induced ·the ·State B·oard of 
Equalization to include the lot in question in its right 
of way assessment. On the other ha·nd the owners of the 
lot had paid taxes upon it as asses·sed by the oonnty 
assessor. The si tua.tion was exactly the reverse of that 
involved in the .case. at bar. This c:ourt held th,at since 
the State ·B·oard of Equa.lization had no power to assess 
the lot that the railroad company ·could not rely up·on 
the payment of any such taxes as a basis for adverse 
po.s.session and disallo"7 cd their rights, using the follow-
ing language : 
''Under the undisputed evidence, either ;tihe State 
Board of Equalization had jurisdiction to make 
the assessment for taxation of the property in 
question, or the .county assessor had it. The right 
to assess the .same property could not exist in 
both at the same time. We think the power to 
assess lot 8 was vested in the county assessor, and 
that the State B·oard of Equalization had no juris-
dic1tion over any part of lot 8 e~cept the strip 
taken and oc.cupied by the railroad company as a 
right of way. If the railroad company desires 
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to -claim title by adverse posses·sion to prop~erty 
other than .such as has been used and ·occupied di~s­
tinctively for railroad purposes, it must prove 
that itt has paid all the taxes that were assessed 
by the local authorities, or show that such assess-
ment was made without authority, or that the 
taxes levied against tthe property were void for 
s-ome other reason. We think no one would seri-
·ously contend that an individual might take 
possession of any portion of the right of way or 
depot grounds or other real property used by a 
railr:oad company for railroad purposes, and, by 
giving sueh portion a .particular des~crip,tion for 
the purposes of taxation, he .could thereby with-
draw the property from the jurisdi,ction of the 
State Board ·Of E:qualization and place it within 
the power of the loeal assessor, and when he had 
done so suceeed in his ~claim that :he, the claimant, 
and not the railroad· -company, had paid the taxes 
.a.n-d hence had acquired title 1by adverse posses-
sion. Yet, if what the appellant claims in this 
ca.se ·can be sustained, then we can see no good 
reason why an individual may no,t, by his own 
act, determine what is and what is not railroad 
property for the .Purpo:s-es of assessment and 
taxation. Would not the question, namely, if the 
railroad company may do this, why cannot an 
individual do s-o, have to be a'nswered either in the 
negative or the affirmative in favor. or against 
either claimant~ We are of the .opinion, there-
fore, that appellant has not brought its -claim of 
adverse posses~ion within the purview of s-ec,tion 
2866, .supra, and hence this claim must fail.'' 
See als·o Gr:arys Harbor Commercial Compa;ny v. 
McCullooh, (Wash.) 1'93 Pac. 709. 
The power to tax mining property is vested entirely 
in the Stat:e T.ax Commission by ~he -constitution and the 
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statutes; and no county officer has any right to add to 
or change the assessment by the State Tax Commission, 
and any attempted asses~ment of .all or any portion of 
the Clays Placer Clairn by the c·ounty Assessor was a 
mere nullity. 
In tw·o Federal eases, Sa.Zt Lake Coun~ty v. Utaih 
Oopper Comp·am.y, 294 Fed. 199, and Be:a,ver Cownty v. 
South Utah J.llines cf: Sm.elters, 17 F:ed. (2d) 577, it was 
iheld that attempts -of Salt Lake ,c:ounty and Bea:ver 
County, respectively, to tax tailings and tailings dumps 
through assessment hy ~the county assessor were invalid 
and a nullity. In the Beaver County case the Circuit 
Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit sai~d this· was true 
even though the mine itself had been worked out. We' 
quote the following from !the Salt Lake ·County case: 
''These tailings are a pr·oduct of the plain-
tiff's mine. The limitation of .the power of the 
Legislature by se.ction 4 of article 13 of the Con-
stitution prevented the existence of a.ny author-
ity or power in the taxing officers of the -county 
to assess them or to levy taxes upon them for the 
years 19jl7 and 1918. ' ' 
Plaintiff proceeds upon the erroneous assumption 
t:P.at the county assessor has the power to tax surface 
rights -of mining :claims. Thi~s contention flies right in 
the teeth .of ,the provisions .of Sections 80-'5-3 .and 80-5-5~6 
of our Revised Statutes .and the Rio Grande Railway 
cases .and the two Federal de·cisions hereinbefore re-
ferred to. 
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This p·roposi tion aJ one is sufficient to effe.ctually 
disp~ose of this ease, because if plaintiff has paid no taxes 
assessed aeeording to law he is not ·en1titled to recover. 
'There are other reasons, ,however, why he could not 
re·eover upon the basis of his alleged tax payments, if 
we were t-o assume that the .county assess:o:r had the 
power to make the assessments. 
In the first place the purpor~ted payment! of taxes by 
plain tiff is not tied to the tract of land to which plaintiff 
is attempting to quiet title. Ilt will be observed tha.t to 
and including the year 19,27 the purported assessment 
niade !by the county assessor in the name of plaintiff 
deseribed the property as '''Improvements on Clays 
Placer.'' In 1928 this wa.s -changed to ''Improvements 
on Clays Placer, ·C~opperton, Bingham Canyon below 
town". In 1928 the description was similar to 1929, but 
someone changed the wording in red ink to insert ''Real 
Estate and Improvements" in the place of just the word 
"Improvements". The same thing occurred in 1930. 
From 19·31 on the property was described as ''Real 
Estate and Impr~ovements on- Clay Placer, Copperton, 
Bingham Canyon below town''. 
Any sueh purported g~eneral assessment without 
s.peei:fically describing the particular portion of the 
Clays Placer to be· ·charged with the tax would not he 
sufficient to -constitute a lawful assessment against the 
surface only of a particular and limited por1tion of the 
Clays Pla·cer. 
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J'loon v. Salt La.ke (!o'lJ!Yt,ty, 27 Utah 435. This was 
an action to quiet title. Salt Lake County was claiming 
under tax title, the assessments 'Yhich resulted in the 
sales ·being·levioo upon the follo,vin·g described property: 
'' 'Pt. N. E. Quarter of s.ec. 26, Township 1, 
North, Range 1 ,, ... est Salt Lake Meridian,' .and, 
'In N. \\T. quarter iof •N. E. Quarter of Se.c. 26, 
To,vnship· 1 North, Range 1 West, :Salt L,aike 
Meridian. No. of acres, 7, more or less.' '' 
In reYersing the decree in favor of defendant S·alt 
Lake ~County this c-ourt said: 
'' Ilt will b8 0 bserved that under these de-
scriptions the land in question might have been 
located in any part of the larger tract mentioned. 
Its location was left wholly uncertain and inde-
finite. Such descriptions are calculated to 
mislead the owner of the premises; and do not 
comply with the requirements of the law. At the 
time the assessments in eontroversy were made, 
it was incurn!bent upon the assessing officer to 
des·cribe real property with reasonable certainty, 
as ;to locality and quantity. 1 C:omp. Laws Utah 
1888, section 2013. A proper des.eription of the 
real estate to be taxed, in the assessment and 
notice of sale, was a. prerequisite to a valid sale. 
Where, the.refore, as in this instance, the assessor 
failed to des·eribe the land as required by law, all 
the subsequent proceedings under the assessment 
were null and void. It f1ollows that the defendant 
county acquired no title to the land by virtue of 
the tax sale. * * * In Olsen v. Bagley, 10 
Utah 49i2, 49'5, 37 Pac. 739, 740, it was said: 'Tax 
sales are m.ade exclusively under statutory power, 
and, unless all the neeessary prerequisites .of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
statute are ea.rried out, the tax sale be-comes 
invalid. If one of the prerequisites fail, it is as 
fatal as if all failed. The power vested in a 
:public officer to sell land ±io~r the nonpayment of 
taxes is a. naked power, not coupled with an 
interest, and every prerequisite to the exer.cise of 
the power must pre-cede its exercise. The title to 
be aequired under statutes .authorizing the sale of 
land for the nonpayment of taxes is regarded as 
stricti juris, and whoever sets up a tax title must 
show that .all the requirements of the law have 
been -complied with.' '' 
This court in the case of Tintic Undine Mining Com--
pany v. Ercafnbrack, 93 Utah ·561, invalidated the tax 
proceedings where the des~cription of the property sought 
to be 'taxed was partially incomplete and uncertain as 
in the .case at bar. Mr. Justice Larson, speaking for the 
court, invalidated t~he proceedings in the following 
language: 
":A·s to the errors in. description of the prop-
·erty, they are even more serious and more evident. 
When real property is assessed or sold for taxes, 
the des·c.ription must be such that the property 
;can be definitely ktro:wn and located. The tax 
becomes a lien on the property, and the de-s-crip-
tion must be definite enough for the lien to atta·ch 
to the property without extra.neous evidence. If 
there is no lien, there ·can be no sale. It must be 
definite enough so the .o:wner will know just what 
property is being sold, and a. pt·ospective pur-
·chaser will know what particular property he 
.could ibuy, so as to determine i·ts value. By all 
these tests this assessment and ta.x sale must fail. 
No township, range, or section is given in whi~h 
the property is lo:ca.ted, though the same appeared 
of re·c·ord. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
"The statute requires tha,t, where land has 
been sectionalized by the g·overnment, the section 
or fractional se-rtion: must be given a.nd all par-
cels and subdivisions. The assessments here 
involved simply loeat.e the property in the Tintie 
Mining District, Jot No. 3615. N1nthin·g to s:how 
the townhip in whi~ch the lot is loca.ted, or whether 
or not it is a rity lot, pla.tted as such, .and ini what 
city. No lien could attach by virtue thereof 
because no ·one could knio"r the land to which it 
attached. ' ' 
Th·en, too, the uncontradicted evidence showed that 
plaintiff did not pay the purported ass·essments for the 
years 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 and 19·33, but on the othe~ 
hand permitted ;the property, whatever it was, to go 'bo 
tax deed. In 193£ plaintiff paid Salt Lake C:ounty the 
sum ·Of $143.;25 and thereafter received a deed quit-
claiming Salt Lake 'County's right, title, an·d interest in 
and to ''R. E. and Imps. on 'Cla.ys Placer, Cupperton, 
Bingham Canyon below ·town". This is undoubtedly the 
oooo.si•on when someone went back and changed the 
assessment records for th~e years 1929 and 19•30 to insert 
the words "Real Estate'' and '·'R. E .. and''' in red ink 
in front of the word ''Improvements''. B·e that as it 
may, such purported purchase of an indefinite and uncer-
tain portion of the Clays Placer Claim would neither ·be 
sufficient as a ·eonveyan~ce or as a des-cription for the 
payment of taxes. 
In fact the pur-chase of property at tax sales does 
not constitute the payment of taxes at all. When property 
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is sold for taxes the property itself pays the taxes and 
the pur-chaser buys the property. 
Ho;ns on v. B ur·ris, 86 Utah 424; 
Wilson v. Salt Lake County, 57 Utah 274. 
2 C. J. 208, ;Section 432, Adverse Possession: 
''"P·ermitting the land to be sold for taxes and 
buying it in is not a payment of taxes within the 
meaning of any of these statutes.'' 
'There is yet another obje-ction to the purported pay-
ment ·Of taxes by plaintiff. Section 80-5-12 provides that 
~the pr1operty shall be ass-essed in the name of the re-cord 
owner, and under Se.ction 80-5-18 if the property is 
claimed by more than one person tha.t the claimant may 
h1ave his name inserted with that of the person to him 
the land is assessed. Since plaintiff was not the record 
owner of the property any assessment in his name was 
not in .conformity with the statute, even if it had been 
made by the legally constituted taxing authority 1and 
could not ,constitute complianc.e 'vith the statutory pro-
visions that he must have paid ail taxes assessed a,ccord-
ing to law. 
Here again we not only have the provisi:ons of 
~Section 80-5-12 making it mandatory to assess property 
in the name of the record owner, but we have in addition 
decisions by this court invalidating assessments in the 
name of one who is not the owner. 
Salt Lake Investment C·o. v. 0. S. L. Ra~l­
road, 46 Utah 203; 
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Tintic Un-dine Min.in.g Co. v. Eroanbrack, 
93 Utah 561. 
·T,he purported assessment in the case a.t bar by the 
county assessor in the name of a person not the owner 
of record and eovering· a very uncertain and indefinite 
portion of the Cl~ays Placer seems to fit very perfe.c:tly 
into the lang11ag·e used by Mr. Justice Larsen in the 
Tinti~ Undine Mining Company case, supra, wherein he 
said: 
''Such a jumble of wrong names ·could easily mis-
lead and is clearly not a -compli,ance with the 
statute under many decisions of this eourt. The 
records are at the courthouse and the assessor 
must not be permitted to deprive an owner o.f 
his property by neglect and palpable inaccuracies 
in his official work.'' 
We might add to this comment by Mr. Justice Larsen 
by statin-g that in addition to the jumble of wrong names 
and uncertain descriptions that the jumble was further 
·muddled in this case by having the assessment made by 
an illegal taxing agen~cy. 
To summarize: the purported levy of taxes, upon the 
basis of which pl~aintiff attempts to assert adverse posses-
sion, were illegal in aibont every fundamental and neces-
sary particular. They were assessed by the wrong taxing 
agency In the 'vrong name, and purported to cover an 
uncertain and indefinite piece of real or personal 
property. 
Since, therefore, plaintiff f·ailed to prove the pay-
men-t iof taxes assessed acc-ording to law during the seven 
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ye~ar period immediately preceding the commencement 
of the action, he .comes directly u~der the condemnation 
.of numerous ptah eases holding that failure to prove 
payment of taxes lawfully asse'3sed and levied defeats 
any a~c.tion for ~adverse possession. A most recent de·cision 
upon this point is Peterson v. Johnson,, 84 Utah 89. 
·The langua,ge of the statute, however, Section 
104-2-12 is c-onclusive upon the subject that in no case 
shall adverse possession be ·considered established under 
the provisions of any section of the -code unless it shall 
he shown that the party claiming adverse possession has 
paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon 
such land according to law. 
This. failure on the part ·OI the p1aintiff to prove 
payment of taxes by ihimself is sufficient to sustain the 
judgment of the trial.court in dismissing the action with 
prejudiee. It was not necessary for defendants to prove 
that the~ themselves paid taxes upon the property in 
question. D·efendants produced their evidence however, 
to the effect that. during this ·entire period of time, 
namely, during the seven years immediately preceding 
institution of the suit, the State Tax Commissio1;1 
had levied taxes. upon the Clays Placer Mining ·Claim, 
and the whole thereof, and tha.t defendants had paid 
those taxes. :This probably was not necess~ary. on the 
part of defendants sinee plaintiff had not bas-ed his case 
upon the theory that no taxes had been levied or paid 
upon the· surface rights, but on the con~rary alleged that 
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taxes had been lawfully assess.ed and that. he had p-aid 
them. 
·The trial colrrt found that the ·Tax Commission had 
levied a full tax on both the surface a.nd sub-surface, and 
we submit that tl1e eourt "Tas right in so finding. 
While defendants paid taxes for upwards of twenty 
years on the entire mining clraim, it is neeessa.ry to con-
sider only the taxes levied by the Tax C!ommission sin,c:e 
its creation, as that period covers the .seven statutory 
years. 
·The Tax Commission was created in 19'31. It was 
stipulated ('Tr. 103-104) tha.t the traxes paid by defend-
ants were levied by the State ·Tax Commission. The 
property was des.cribe~d as ''()lays Placer Lot 118, West 
Mountain Mining District'' and the valuation placed 
under the heading '''Real Estate", and the amount p·atid 
was1. designated'' general tax.'' 
Seetion 80-3-1, subse·ction 2, states that the words 
'''real estate'-, when used in title 80, relating to revenue 
and taxation, in·cludes : 
'' (a) The possession of, elaim to ownership 
of or right to the possession of, 1and. 
(b) All mines, miner!als, and quarries in and 
under the land, all timber belonging to individuals 
or corporations growing or being on the lands of 
this state or the Unite~d S1tates-, and all rights and 
privileges appertaining thereto. 
(e) Improve1nents. '' 
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This, therefore, is a comprehe·nsive term and includes 
not only the surf!ace but all mines, minerals and quarries 
under the land and all improvements on thje land. A 
general assessment, therefore, under this heading ''Reral 
E.state'' includes both the surface and sub--surface, and 
by the statute expressly inrludes the mines, minerals and 
quarries and the surface. But, says plaintiff, all mineral 
ground must be assessed twice: first the s~rface, and 
second sub-surface. Not S·O. There is no such provision 
in the law. Mineral 1and is no different from any other 
land. It is all supposed to be taxed upon the basis of its 
full value. For mineral land, however, there is a differ-
e'nt method provided in the statute for arriving at the 
full value. 
1Section 80-5-46 prescribes the gener•al p~owers and 
duties of the State T~ax Commission, one of which powers 
and duties under sub-section 6 is to assess all real, per-
sonal, and mixed property which the Tax Commission is 
iby the ·Constitution and laws .o.f the State required to 
assess. Section 11 of Article XIII .creates the State 'T,ax 
Commission and p;rovides that it shall assess mines. 
Section 80-5-55 provides that the State Tax Commission 
must prepare each year a book called "'The Assessment 
B·ook .of Mines," in which must he entered the assess-
ment of all mines in the State, and Section 80-5-56 pro-
v!·des that all metaliferous mines and mining elaims, both 
placer 'and rock in place, shall he assessed a:t $5.00 per 
aere, and in addition thereto at a value ·equal to three 
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times the net annual proceeds thereof. This section 
oontains the f.ollo"""ing- language: 
''In all-cases "'"here the surface of lands is owned 
by one person and the mineral underlying such 
lands is owned by another, such property rights 
shall be separately assessed to the respective 
owners.'' · 
Thus it "\Yill be seen that the only authority given to 
the 'Tax Commission, and the .only duty placed upon the 
State Tax Commission to make a segregated assessment 
of the surface and mineral rights is where the surface is 
owned by one person and the mineral underlying the 
surfa,ce is owned by another. ·Otherwise in the ahsen:ce 
of such a segregation a general assessment under the 
heading ''Real Est!ate" by the Tax Commission is ex-
pressly, by the pr.ovisions of S~ection 80-3-1, comp.rehen-
·Sive as including both the surface and mineral rights. 
This provision is simply an additional precaution 
which the legislature has taken ·in the case of mining 
property to see that mining claims 'are taxed to their 
full value. l\fining pr·operty lends itself to an easy and 
advantageous segregation of the mineral rights from the 
surface rights. This segregation is accomplished by the 
owner of the property when he conveys with a reserva-
tion of miner~al rights or when ,he .conveys the mineral 
rights separate and apart from the surface. In the 
absence .of such segregation, however, a general asses·s-
ment of the mining claim under the he,ading ''Real 
Estate' ' ,comprehends the entire estate. The Tax Con1-
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mission ha.s the power to make this general assessment, 
and this is exactly wha.t was done in the .case at bar. 
If plaintiff's theory were ·corre·ct, which it is not, 
the ·State Tax ,C'ommission could make no general asses·s-
ment upon mining .claims, notwithstanding the exp;res·s 
provision of ·our statute givin.g it authority S·O to do. 
The law likewise requires, not only as to mining property 
but a.s to all property, that impr·ovements on real ·estate 
shall ihe assessed in ~ddition to the value .of the real prop-
erty. This does not -create separ.ate, distinct a.nd inde-
p·endent titles. If an ·asses·sment were levied upon Lot 
5, 'Blo·ek 2, Salt Lake City Survey, lmder the heading 
•·'Rea.] Estate", .could it be -eontended, in view of .S,ection 
80-3-1, which expressly provides that improvements are 
comprehended within the provisi.ons ''real estate',. that 
no .taxes were levied upon the improvements' Certainly 
not. ·The 'Tax ·C!olllliilission or the assessor, as th:e ease 
migiht be, might be guilty of disregarding the provision 
of the statute which pr·ovide'S that impr.ovements sha.ll 
be ·Separately stated, but ·certainly no one ,could contend 
th~at such an assessment was not a general assessment 
and comprehended the improvements in view of Section 
80-3-1. Improv·ements a.re attached to the real property 
.and are a part of it. So· is the surface of a mining claim, 
rand so are the miner!als. Certainly the legislature had 
some purpose . in. mind w;hen it proVided that for the 
purpose of. ta.xation an assessment under the heading 
'' real·estate '' in-cludes the pos·s·ession of, clajm to, owner-
ship of, ~or right to the p·ossession ofl lands and all mines, 
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minerals and qu:arries in or under them, and all rights 
and privileg·es appertaining thereto, together with im-
provements thereon. And certainly this court in the 
Eckman ease hereinafter referred to \vas not engaging 
in idle chatter \vhen it referred to an assessment for 
''all ~purposes'' as embflacing surface and sub-surfa,ce 
rights. 
But, says plaintiff, there has been a segregation of 
the surface and mineral rights in this .case. We naturally 
answer that question by asking when .and by wh,om ~ 
Certainly the legal owner of the property made no such 
segregation, and a stranger to the title can make no 
such segregation e~cepting by adverse p·oS"session, and 
adverse possession is not accomplished e:x:cepting by full 
compliance with the statute. One of the re·quisites of 
the statute is that the adverse claimant pay all taxe·s 
levied .acoording to law. During ·the years preceding 
19·29 there certainly was no p·ayment of taxes by plain-
tiff because -among other~ reasons, the purported levy 
was by the county assessor, whereas it shoul·d have 
been by the State Board of Equalization. (Laws of 
Utah 1919, ·Chapter 114). Up to that time the assess-
ment admittedly ~covered only imp~rovements on Clays 
Placer. During the years 19'29, 1930, 1931, 1932 and 
1933 there was no payment of taxes at all by any-
one except defendants, plaintiff failing to pay even 
the illegally levied taxes assessed by the county as-
sessor. It is difficult, therefore, to see how plaintiff 
can contend that there ever was :a segregation by anyone. 
Certainly in the absence of payment of taxes there never 
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could have been any segregation until adverse possess'ion 
was .complete through the payment of taxes. 
P1aintiff implie-s, however, that if his payment was 
illegal, the defendants' payment was inadequate because, 
as he contends, it .c.overed only the mineral rights, hence 
no taxes were levied upon the .surface and he is never-
theless entitled to a de-cree for adverse p·ossession. There 
are two things wrong with that proposition: First, there 
is no foundation in plaintiff's ·complaint for any such 
theory nr any such alleged cause of action. His com-
plaint does not allege that no taxes were levied but on 
the .contrary alleges that taxes were lawfully levied a:nd 
that he- paid them. The court has definitely and cor-
rec:tly answered this in the negative. Second, the State 
Tax Commission, as we have heretofore ·shown, levied 
a full .and complete tax .on the mining claims, both' sur-
face- and sub-surfa1ce, which was paid by defendants. 
Pilaintiff attempts to make argument to the effect 
that the assessment by the State Tax ·Ciommission wa,s 
partial ·and covered only the mineral rights, out of the 
fa-ct that the assessment was based upon valuation of 
$5.00 per a-cre. We answer that by stating that as to 
the owner of the elaim whoi had made no segregation of 
the mineral and surfa:ce rights, that was all there was 
to do and it amounted to a full .and complete assessment. 
Plaintiff, as .a squatter or trespasser upon the ground, 
or as the -claimant of some improvements thereon, may 
have been obligated to: pay taxes upon the value of his 
p·ersonal property or im~provements, and apparently this 
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is exa,ctly "·hat the ·County assessor plaeed upon the tax 
rec-ords and "·hat plaintiff was p.aying. 
When" a person for his o"''ll convenience and at his 
own expense ·constr.ucts a building upon the land of 
another the building re1nains personal property and 
belongs to the one \Yho constructs it. 
Da.tne v. Da·me, 
38 N. H. 429·, 75 Am. Dec. 19,5; 
Work1nan v. Henrie, 
71 Utah 400, 266 ·Pac. 1033, 58 A. L·. R. 
1346. 
The law expressly recognizes the possibility of such 
improvements being owned b~ a person other than th'e 
owner of the realty, and provides for the assessment 
there·of not again.st the owner of the rea:lty but against 
the owner of the improvements as personalty. 
Our statute, 80~3-1, sub-section 3, states that the 
word ''improvements'' includes building, structures, 
fixtures, fences and improvements upon or affixed to the 
land, whether tlhe title ha.s been acquired t·o the la;nd or 
not, thus recognizing the ·p·ossibility that the land may 
he assessed in the name of one individual and improve-
ments in the name of another, dependent upon the 
·circumstances of the particular case. 
2 ·Cooley on Taxation 1219, ·se-ction 559, is as follows:· 
''H1owever, if buildings or other impr10vements are 
erected on exe.mpt land or on land owned by 
another person they a.re taxable separately t1o 
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t1heir qwner, provided they are not fixtures, unless 
otherwise provided by statute, either as real or 
personal prop-erty aecording to circumstan-ces.'' 
T~·ere is nothing unusual about this situation. If the 
plaintiff ·owned any improvements whi·ch had been placed 
upon the lands and .p·remises of defendants, either with 
or wit·hout their consent, th,ey were taxable in the name 
of plaintiff. This has nothing to do with a general- tax 
upon the rea1ty which -comprehended both the surface 
and mineral rights under the ~heading ''real estate,'' 
which by the s.ame ·statute is made all comprehensive. 
As before stated, howeve:r, the .a.s,sessment made 
against defendants and. the /tax paid by defendants 
covered the entire Clays Placer Mining -claim and was 
levied by the le·gally .constituted taxing authority, and 
there never was any s-egregation of the mineral rigihts 
from the surfaee ground either made by them or per-
mitted to be made by them so as to warrant or authorize 
any additional assessment u·nder the provisions of S.ec-
tion 80-5-'5·6. 
The inconsistency of- plaintiff's position is very 
evident. This is mining property-alleged and admitted 
by both parties. The Tax c·ommission is to assess 
mining property. Plaintiff alleges and now contends 
that an illegal assessment by the -county assessor of 
''Improvements on Clays Placer'' and ''Re. and Imp. 
on Clays Placer'' in plaintiff's name covers the surface 
only, but that a legal assessment of ''Clays Placer Min-
ing Claim'' under the heading ''~R-eal· Estate'' in the 
names of defendants does not cover the surface. Con-
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sistency thou art a jewel! Having thus alleged and 
no"\v insisting that such a general description covers 
the surface fQr his ~own benefit he denies that ·the same 
rule of la'v applies to defendants. Plaintiff cannot 
take one view of the law for his own benefit and an 
opposite one as to _d.efendants. Of course, the obvious 
answer is that such a general description 0overs the 
surface in both instances, but the difference is that one 
is a -Ieg·al assessment and the other illegal. 
Plaintiff seems to feel, however, that the cases of 
Utah Copper Compa;ny v. Charndler, 45 Utah 85, and 
Utwh ·Copper Compain)ry v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, are a. 
complete answer to all of this argument, and states that 
they are on all f.ours with the cas.e at har and .are against 
our contentions. 
A more careful reading and understanding of thog,e 
cases demonstrates the error into which counsel has 
fallen. 
·There are two things which .absolutely distinguish 
the .Chandler ·case from the case at bar, first the fa,cts, 
ana second, the law. That case was tried up·on an agreed 
statement of facts, namely, that the taxes levied and 
aesessed against the Copp·er Company as owner of the 
mining .claim was at the ra.te of $5.00 p·er acre but tha·t 
''there was no assessment or taxation against the plain-
tiff (Copper ·Company) on the lots or the improvements 
thereof; also that the defendants (~Chandler) and their 
grantees paid all the taxes a·ssessed on the lots .and 
premises in question. Also it \\ras agreed that sueh 
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assessment aga.int the Copper Ciompa:ny and c:handler 
'''shall in no manner be regarded as double as·sessments, 
but, .on the -contrary, each assessment shall be in itself 
a separate and distinct assessment, cumulative rather 
than double". The only que-stion raised in the case as 
to le-gality of either assessment was upon the ground of 
uneertain ty. 
The assessments in that case were under Section 
2504 of the Revis·ed Statutes of 1'898, wihich provided 
that all mines and mining claims shall be taxed at the 
price paid the United States therefor, unless the surface 
ground or s-ome .part thereof is used for other than min-
ing purposes, in which case the surfa·ce ground shall be 
taxed at its· value for sueh: other purpose. 
Since decision in the Chandler case, however, the 
last provision has been changed by adding the following: 
''In all cases where the surface of lands is 
owned hy ·One person and the mineral underlying 
such lands is owned hy another, such property 
rig1htS' shall ;be separately assessed to the respec-
tive owners.'' (Sec. 80-5-56 R. S. U. 1933). 
·Of course when the Copper C'o;mpany .stipulated that 
it had paid no such tax upon the surface, but that on the 
other hand Chandler had paid taxes legally assessed 
.against the surface, and further stipulated that such 
taxes were .cumulative, not double, they in effect stip-
ula,ted thems·elves ·Out of court. As before stated, the 
only .a tt'ack which they made upon the Chandler assess-
ment was upon the groun·d of uncertainty. Of ~eourse 
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courts decide cases upon th·e facts presented to them. 
The rase at bar is distinctly different, namely, plaintiff 
has paid no taxes legally assessed .and, on the other hand, 
defendants have paid full and complete assessment upon 
the entire mining· claim, as found by the trial court and 
.as establiS'hed by th·e facts. Nor has the Strate of Utah 
been deprived of any taxation during this period of time 
because the surface improvements·, constituting all that 
plaintiff owned or ever .claimed to own, were assess·ed~ 
to him and paid by him. It is apparent that in the 
·Chandler case there was also a. claim ·Of right to the 
surfa·ce on behalf of Chandler, .sin'Ce the ·C.opper ·C·om-
.pany wholly failed to rais-e that question. 'This was 
equivalent to conceding in that cas·e that there had in 
fact been a segregation through the facts warranting the 
claim of title by Chandler. 
The Chandler ease was very quickly followed by the 
E:ckman case. The surface of the Mirror Lode Mining 
Claim ha·d for many years been platted into town lots, 
and E·ckman had been in actual possession under claim 
of right and had paid taxes thereon .and had a.lsro: paid 
taxes . upon the improvements. The Copper Company 
on the other hand had paid taxes· only upon the mining 
.claims. Whether sueh: assessment to the ·Copper ·Com-
pany was full and complete assessment was not made 
to appear in the .case. A decree in favor of Eckman 
was rever·sed and remande·d for the reason that it did 
not a p.pear that in assessing the mining claim to the 
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Copper c:ompany, who held the legal title thereof, it was 
not assessed to it for .all purposes~ 
Here, again, it will be observed that the facts are 
entirely different from the ·case at har, becaus-e in that 
ca·se the ground had been platted and it was undisputed 
that Eckman traeed his title back and established a claim 
of title such as satisfied the statute in that re.garod, and 
i'n addition ~showed that he had paid taxes assessed 
and levied al(~cording to law, the legality of which was 
not a,ttacked. This is a decidedly different proposition 
from the case at bar. Also, of course, in the Eckman 
~case, as in the Chandler ease, the statute with reference 
to the asHessment and taxation of surface rights was 
different from- our law, since the creation of the State 
Tax Commission, in that the old law made no reference 
whatsoever to segregated ownership, whereas the present 
law takes cognizan·ce of segregation by requiring a 
limited assessment against the legal owner, and a surface 
assessment against the adverse :claimant, or an assess-
ment in the names of hoth parties where there has been 
either a ·Segregation or where there is an adverse cl'aim 
asserted. 
These provisions of the law with reference to limited 
assessments in the case of segregation or the inS'ertion 
of both names in the ·event of an adverse or additional 
-claimant are for the very purpose of info:rm5-ng the 
owner of the legal title of the facts as shown by the tax 
rec:ords. Otherwise a person .paying his as.sessm·ent upon 
a mining· clamn may be lulled into a sense of security, 
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believing that he has paid all the· taxes assessed against 
the mining ~laim, wh·en in fact S'ome squatter or tres-
passer may have created an additional liability .for taxes'. 
Thus we see that neither the Chandler -ease nor the 
Eckman case can giYe any ·comfort or assistance to the 
plaintiff. T:hose rases ''Tere both decided upon the facts 
presented, and the la.w as it then stood and the court 
decided the issues inv-olved in those ·ca,S'es. 
A so:mewhat similar question was raised in the case 
of Rarn.ard Re~alty Co. v. City of Butte, 145 Pac. 9·46. 
The B~arna.rd Placer Mining Claim was situated within 
the ·corporate limits of the City of Butte. The owners 
·caus-ed a portion of the surface of the ,claim to be sub-
divided into lots and blocks and made an addition to the 
city. The remaining and unplatted area was assessed 
originally as placer mining property at· $2.50 per 
acre, but subsequently the assessor, at the instance 
of the city authorities, again assessed the area in 
controversy at a valuati~on of $19,000.00 upon the theory 
that it had an independent value as city lots. When 
the treasurer proceeded to advertise and sell th·e 
property as delinquent, the action was brought to obtain 
a decree de-claring the assessment null and void. The 
·Constitution of .Montana was the same as the C'onstitu-
tion of Utah before the amendment, and provided that 
mining property should be taxed at the price paid the 
United States therefor unless the surface ground is used 
for other than mining purposes and has a separate 
and independent value for such other purposes, in which 
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.case the surface ground shall be taxed a.t its value for 
such other purpose. The Supreme C:ourt of Montana 
invalidated the as-sessment and us·ed the following lan-
guage as to the meaning of this particular language and 
its applicability to the owner of a mining claim: 
''Recognizing the faet that such propery is not 
generally suscepti1ble of profitable US'e unless the 
deposits therein are extracted and put into com-
mercial f~orm, and in order to ·encourage the work 
of .profitable development by prote-cting it against 
exactions whieh: might prevent this result, it was 
deemed that .the owner of a mining claim would 
fully acquit himself of his obligation to the public 
by :Raying a tax: (1) Upon the a1crea.ge at the 
price paid to the United States; (2) upon the 
machinery used in mining and ·surface improve-
.ments, etc., upon or appurtenant to the claim, 
whieh have a. value independent thereof; and (3) 
upon the net proceeds of the product. So long as 
the .claim is used and held ex.clusively for mining 
purposes, the owner of i,t is not required to bear 
any ·other burden; but when the property, having 
by its loea.tion acquired a value for some inde-
pendent use, is .dev-oted by the ow'ner to such use, 
it becomes a.t once subject to: taxation at that 
value as is· other real estate, to be ascertained 
by the ass-essing . offieer just as he as:certains the 
value of -other land for the purpose of taxation. 
By devoting it to the new use, the ow'ner, so to 
speak, :creates an estate which, in the eye of the 
law, is regarded as independent of the original 
estate and is subject to taxation as such. It will 
be noted, however, that two 1eonditions must con-
cur to' justify the imposition ·of the additional 
burden; viz., the surface ground, or some part 
thereof, must be used for other than mining pur-
poses, and it must have an independent value for 
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that purpose. When these ~conditions -concur, but 
not other\Yise, the owner mu.st assume the addi-
ti07l.al b 1 t·r den. ' ' 
.A.s before stated, the original statute ''rith reference 
to taxation of mines (La\YS .of Utah 1919, Cha1p~ter 114, 
Section 5864), and also Section 2504 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1898 under whi~h both the ·Chandler and 
Eckman cases \Yere decided, simply provided that mines 
should be taxed at the price paid the United States there-
for unless the surface ground is used for other than 
mining purp.oses and has a separate and independent 
value for ·such other purpos·e, in which case the surface 
ground shall be taxed at its value for sueh other pur-
pose. Those provisions were repealed when the Tax 
Commission \Yas created in 1931, and instead thereof 
Section 804j-56 was enacted. Instead of the general 
provision contained in the prior enactments the legiS'-
lature changed the wording to read as follows: 
''In .all cases where the surface of land is owned 
by one person and the mineral underlying such 
lands is owned by another, such property rights 
shall be separately assessed to the respective 
owners.'' 
The effect of this was to require separate assess-
ment of the minerai rights from the surface only where 
there ;has been a severance either created or permitted 
lby the owner; otherwise the other p-rovisions of the 
statute control which call for a general as·sessment in 
the name of the owner. Our present statute is similar 
in effect to one enacted by the State of Kansas which 
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provided that -where the fee to the surfa.oe was 1n any 
person or persons and the right to the minerals therein 
' in another, there should be a. separate assessment and 
taxation of thos·e interests. The State of Kansas sought 
to tax a leas·ehold interest in mineral lands: as a separ.ate 
entity .from the real estate which had been taxed in the 
name of the ·owner of the realty. The .Supreme C:ourt 
of K·ansas d·enied the right of the taxing a.uthoritie·s to 
thus tax the mineral estate as a separate entity in the 
absence .of severance, and -construed the general meaning 
of th·e statute in the ·ca:se of Ka~nsas Na:tura:l Gas Com-
p~any v. Boa~rd of CO'nvmission.ers, 89 Pac. 750, in the 
following language : 
'' '·Land,' .of ;course, is an all-comptehensive 
term, and includes ·everything the elementary law 
books .say it includes. It may be .composed in part 
of minerals, using the term 'minerals' . in the 
popular sense of those inorganic constituents of 
the earth's crust which are commonly obtained 
by mining, or other- process for bringing th·em to 
the surface, for profit. The mineral and non-
mineral portions of land are distinguis1hable and 
severable both in legal theo:ry and in . fact, and 
se!parate property rights in each may coexist. 
Minerals in place are a part of the land i tsel.f, and, 
while they are unsevered, are treated as real 
estate. * * * ·On the other hand, the act as 
clea.rly deals with sev·ered titles. * * * 
"It is contemplated that there :shall be an 
·estate consisting of what is left after th-e mineral 
rights have been 1carv.ed out, and that there shall 
be an estate ·consisting of the mineral rights which 
have been segregated. The sta!tute further c.on-
templat·es that ·each .estate mu,st vest in a sep:a.rate 
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person.. The respective proprietors are called 
'·owners', and tilie estate in the minera:ls is nothing 
short of the right or title to the minerals them-
selve-s as they lie in th-e ground. When such a 
state ·Of affairs exists, the statute regards the 
O"\rner of the minerai rights as the proprietor of a 
distinct item of property which is taxable to him, 
apart from that which is taxa1ble to the owner of 
the tract, parcel, or lot in which the minerals are 
located, and it makes provision for separate lists, 
·entries, des-criptions, valuations, etc. The right 
or title to the minerals, as the statute exp·resses 
it, is taxed as realty. The owner :is charged with 
taxes aeeording to the value of his interest, and 
t!!·e owner of the .overlying strata is tax·ed aceord-
ing to the value of the rem,aining intere·st in the 
land. But there rnust be a severance of the right 
to the mineral a.nd nontmineral portions of the 
lan.d, ·respectively, before there cam. be a division 
in taxation. Minerals in place bein.g real est·a,te, 
the act assumes t.ha.t instruments creating se-
parate interests 1Jn them ~vill be pla.ced of record, 
but it provides that, if such instruments are not 
recorded within 90 days .after execution, they shall 
become void unless they are brought to the atten-
tion of the tax officials, s·o that the purpose of the 
first part of the section may be aecomplish·ed. As 
before noted, the open~ng sentences of the body 
of the ,act tell just w·hal it proposes to tax, a;nd 
how that subject of taxation shall be liste~d and 
valued and taxed. 
"* * * Until di1seovered and brought to 
the surfa-ce, no severance of title occurs. The 
minerals not only remain a. constituent part of 
the land, but they belong to the owner of the sur-
face soil beneath which they lie.'' (Italics ours). 
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Tihis decision was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court 
.of Kansas in the case of Luman v. Davis, 19·6 P~ac. 107'8, 
in the following language: 
''When such severarn1ce occurs, the minerals are 
separately listed, valued, and taxed as real 
estate." (Italics ours). 
A s-omewhat similar situation was presented to the 
Supreme ~Court of ·Colorado in the cas-e of Kansas City 
Life lrnJSuravnce Co. ·v. P·rowers CoU!Ylty Oil & Gas Com-
p·any, 254 Pac. 438. In that case .a land company had made 
a. severance by ·conveying to an ·oil company the mineral.s 
under the surface and thereafter horrowed from the in-
surance company, and mortgaged the land as security, 
with ,the usual .eovenants .for the payment of ta.x·es. The 
oil company als·o gave a mortgage to the insurance 0om-
pany of the mineral ri~ht.s as additional security for the 
land ·company mortgage. Up.on default the insurance 
company purchased the interest of the land ;company, 
suhject, how·ever, to certain taxes for the years 19122 and 
1923 which the insurance company paid. Thereafter the 
insurance company brought ·suit a.ga.inS't the oil company 
for the deficiency, and the oil ·company sought to have 
the amount of the taxes disallowed upon the .theory that 
the general tax upon the land covered only the surface 
right's, and by reason thereof was not chargeable agains)t 
the oil company as holder of the mineral rights. ~he 
Supreme Court of C'olorado in construing such a ge~­
eral asses·sment on the land as a whole even in the pre-
sence ·Of segregation used the .following language: 
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''It n1ay not be easy to determine the exact 
amount, be•eause the taxes '"ere assessed on the 
land as a whole, ''"'ith no segTegation of the sev-
eral rights of the land co1mpany and the oil com-
pany, but it cannot be impossible, sin·ce the se-
gref?:ation h'fls recently been made by the as!sessor. 
'·'The claim of the defendants in error that 
the taxes in question '"ere asses.sed and levied on 
the interest of the land company only will not 
stand. It is undisputed that there w'a·s one levy 
£n the ordinary ~V'ay, a.s u.p-ovn other land, and 
that the ·insurance comparn-y pa.id the 1vhole tax. 
There -can be no question, then, that the levy 
covered the interest of both the comp~anies de-
fendant, nor that the insurance company has paid 
the oil company's taxes.'' (Italics ours). 
Certainly if that were true in the presence of segre-
gation i·t is doubly true in the r;ase at bar where there i·s 
no evidence of segregation, and where it is uncontra-
di~cted that defendants have paid a general asse·ssment 
upon their lands ·and premisesi as HsseS'sed hy the legally 
constituted taxing auth.orities. 
The State of Indiana has a statute similar in effeet 
to our Section 80-5-56. which requires segregated assess-
ment in all cases where the surface of lands is ·owned by 
one p·erson and the mineral underlying is owned fby 
anoth~r. ·On March 1, 1919· certain mineral lands by 
gene:oal assessment were a~ssessed for taxation. There-
after the O\Yner sold the mineral rights in the property. 
A~er seve:vance the mineral rights were ·separately 
; 
a8sessed to the purchaser, but no deduction was made 
for .a commensurate am1ount from the a:s~sessed valuation 
of the owner. The ·Owner contended that the mineral 
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rights w:ere compreh'ended within the general assess-
ment, ~and that upon segregation the value of the mineral 
rights should be deducted. ·On the other hand, the tax-
ing aulthoiities contended that in ass·esisin.g 'the land 
prior to segregation the minerals were not taken into 
·con:sideration and were not comprehended within the 
general assessment. :Thi.s ·case was -considered by the 
appellate eourt ·Of Indiana in the case of Board of C.om-
m.issioners of Vigo Cownty v. Hale, 15:6 N. E. 172. In 
sustaining the co~ntention of the 1_andowner ~hat he was 
entitled to 1a deduction after ·segreg,ation, the court said: 
"·However, it is only where~ there is ~s-eparate 
ownership of the minin.g right"B thwt the law re-
·quires a S'eparate assessment o\ such rights.'' 
So in the case at har, 11nder our ~neral tax law 
.separate a·s.sessments are made only after segregation, 
and after segregation each party is assessed with the 
value of ·only thmt which he owns. Regardless ·of what 
th·e law may have heen under the old statu\e·s in force 
.when the ~Chandler and ;E,ckman cases we~-. d~cided, 
.such certainly is the law of thi·s State ·since fn.e enact-
ment of Section 80-5-5·6 in 19'31, whi~ch, after a1~ is the 
period ·of time in queSition in this case. 
While the owner may thus create a.n addin .. onal 
·estate in minerall~ands, it certainly was never the in~en­
tion of the legi·slature .that a trespasser or squatter eo11d 
create a ~s-e-grega.tion by causing an illegal ass·essment t1 
be made by an illegal taxing authority when at the same 
tim.e the legally -constituted taxing authorities are asse·ss-
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ing- the full mining claim to the legal owner, and the 
legal O"\Yner is paying a full tax. 
Previous to 1the year 1884 the payment of ta.xe·s was 
not an essential element to the acquisition of title by 
adverse possession in the 'State· ·of Utah. Prior to that 
time adverse ·possession could mature without the legal 
owner having any :actual kn·owledge there-of and. during 
the period o.f time "\Yhen he was fully ·complying with his 
.civic duty with reference to the payment of taxes. The 
injustice ·Of this situa.t1on with reference ~to mining claims 
became immediately apparent because mining property 
is usually located in inaccessible country .and very often 
held as a part of the mineral reserves ·of the state and 
nation for future development by p-eople residing -else-
~here and wh9. may have no occasion ~to actu,ally visit 
the premises. r Als-o in mining country it is well known 
that for pu:r:pose:s -of occupancy people place a ~shack 
whe-re it best suits their purposes, "\vithout regard to 
boundaries. Many 'conflicts occur. Squatters a.nd tres-
pas.sers use what they find handy for their purposes, and 
the real ?""ners very often have no knowledge of what 
is ·occuring. It was to me-et exactly this situation that 
the legisJ.ature in 1884 passed t:he amendment making 
the p~yment of taxes an essential element to 1the aequi-
si~iD? of premi,ses by adverse possessilon. Through thi·s 
method the legal owner might know if he was not 
p.ayin.g taxes and would be led to inquire the rea·son. It 
was to further safeguard this situation that the legis-
lature passed the further amendment in 1931 requiring 
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segregated assessment ·Only in ca.ses of actual segrega-
t~orn, and under the provi·sions of Section 80-5-18 any 
pers.on ·claiming the sarrne :and desiring to ibe ass-ess·ed 
therefor may have his name inserted with tha.t of the 
legal owner. 'The.se safeguards were for the very pur-
pose of informing the legal owner of the fact that he 
was paying a diminished asse·ssment, segregated a:Ss·es~s­
ment, or that some claimant was having his name placed 
upon the tax rolls as a claimant f:olr the purpose of pay-
ing taxe~s. If .a mere trespas·ser may, by his surreptiti-
ous. act unknown to the owner ·Of a. legal estate, be per-
mitted to :ereate .an illegal assessment, and then, by 
paying the same, cause the statute ·Of limitations to run 
and adverse possession to a,c;crue in a mining .claim, the 
pu-rpose's tof thes-e very wise provisions of our taxing 
statutes are entirely defe!ated. 
Horizontal or .segregated assessments are not con-
fined to mineral lands. It is not at all uneommon for 
one person to own the fee ,of real property and another 
to own the buildings. Very often agricultural lands are 
found to contain minerai values. It certainly W·ould be 
an an·omaly in the law if the discovery of oil or other 
mineral could .have the effect ·Of creating a ·segregation 
of titles ·so a·s to ·entirely invalidate a gener.al assess-
ment upon the p·remises and make it possible fot a 
squatter or tre.spas·ser to questi1on the !sufficiency ·or 
validity of the .taxes that had been paid. 
However, as before stated, it was not necessary for 
the trial ·court to find that defendants had paid a. full 
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tax upon the mining claims, nor is it necessary for thi'S 
.court to pass upon that quest1on. Plaintiff had th·e 
privileg·e before commencing' his suit to determine 
whethe-r he 'vould proceed upon the theory that taxes 
had been levied and that they had been paid by plaintiff, 
or~ on the other hand, to take the other theory that no 
taxes 'vha.tsoever had been levied upon the surface. In 
the latter case it would :have been necessary for him to 
prove that negative. He c.hose the form·er theory and 
the cause of action alleged i.s to the effect that taxes 
were lawfully levied, and that they weTe paid by the 
plaintiff. It is too late now, upon a.pp.eal, to change 
theories and by denying the allegation which ihe himself 
made attempt to recover upon the basis that no taxes 
were levied. 
In the case -of Central Pac. Railw-ay Co. v .. Tarpey, 
51 Utah 107, this eourt, speaking ,of the necessity of 
proving the negative where it is ;claimed that no taxes 
were lawfully levied, used the following language: 
''If they were not levied and assessed the burden 
wa·s on .him to show that fact.' If they were levied 
and assessed the b·urden was on him to show 
that he paid them. There is no -other eonclusi1on 
possible under the ~statute as ·construed by the 
authoritie.s. Flrom the foregoing it conclusively 
appears appellant did not pay the taxe·s on the 
land :although they were levied and a.s.ses~sed for 
seven eonsecutive years after his claim :of adverse 
pos~session began to run, hence he did not acquire 
ti tie to the land as against the respondent, the 
holder of the legal title.'' 
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It goe.s without saying that if they intend to prove 
no taxes were levied there must be foundation in the 
pleadings for that kind of a cause of action, not o:rie 
bas.ed upon tJhe theory that ~taxes were lawfully levied. 
It will he observed that ·even now, in plaintiff's brief in 
this cas-e, he a:ss·erts and re-:asserts that taxes were leviea 
and that he paid them, which is destructive of his ~ther 
contenti1nn that no taxes were la.wfully levie·d by the 
Tax Commission against the .surfa;ce. 
We .submit, therefore, that under this very funda-
mental and vi·tal proposition the judgment of the trial 
.court .shoUld be ~sustained and affirmed, regardless .of 
the views which the ·court may entertain with reference 
to any other of the questi.tons pres-e~nted. 
CLAIM OF TITLE AND HOSTILE POS·SES-
SION. (Assignments of Error 2 and 4). 
The trial court found that the occupancy by plain-
tiff of a portion of the lands and premises inViolved in 
the action was without title or claim of title, and also 
found that such possession and occupancy had not been 
hostile or adverse but, .on the other hand, had been in 
subordination to the legal title of defendants. 
Thes-e two assignments of error may very well be 
considered together since they relate to the same gen-
eral subject matter. Plaintiff argues that since his 
evidence showed that he had been in ·Continuous pos-
sessi.on and occupancy of the property for more than 
seven years, namely seventeen years, and that the prem-
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ises were enclosed by a fence, and that he had improved 
the premises, that undeT the authorities t,his ·es~ablished 
claim of title and hostile or adverse possession. He 
cites as authority for this proposition Sections 187 and 
189 of 1 .A.m. Juris. He also cites the case of Pillow v. 
Roberts, 14 L. Ed. 228. 
It is true that there are some authorities to the 
effect that the phrases ''claim of right", ''claim of 
title'' and ''claim of ownership'', when used in con-
nection with adverse possession, mean nothing more than 
intention of the disseizor to appropriate and use the 
lands as his own. And it is also true that under some 
cases such facts may be sufficient to raise a presu.mption 
of adverse claim and 'IJ/Yiless rebutted may establish a 
claim of right. 
Our statute uses the phrase ·''claim of right" as a 
necessary incident to adverse possession under either 
written instrument in Section 104-2-8 or in S·ection 
104-2-11 when adverse possession IS n.ot founded upon 
a written instrument. 
This court in the case of Rieske v. Hoover, 53 Utah 
87, held that under the law of adverse possession it is 
essential, in order that possession may be ·considered 
as being adverse, that there should be an intention to 
claim title. 
There is, h·owever, a decided conflict of authority 
as to the meaning of the phrase "·claim of title", when 
used in connection with adverse possession. There are 
authorities to the effect that "claim of title" is the equiv-
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alent of "color of title". The editor of American 
Jurisprudence seems to have overlooked this line of 
authorities in making that broad general statement. The 
Supreme Court of Montana in a decision rendered Octo-
ber 6, 1937, in the case of Sullivan V'. N eel, 73 Pac. (2d) 
206, in construing their statute, which requires ''claim 
of title'' as a necessary incident to adverse possession, 
used the following language: 
"The phrase 'claim of title' as used in the fore-
going section of the statute is synonymous with 
that of 'eo lor of title.' '' 
This court, while not expressly pass1ng upon the 
question, has nevertheless in numerous cases recognized 
the ·same principle as announced by the Supreme Court 
of Montana by regarding the phrase "claim .of title" 
as the equivalent of "color of title". 
In the case of Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tarpey, 51 
Utah 107, the court, in construing our statute as to the 
sufficiency of a contract as a basis for ''claim of· title'' 
as a foundation for adverse possession, quoted with 
approval the following: 
'' 'An instrument, in order to operate as 
color of title, must purport to convey title to the 
clairnant thereunder, or to those 'vith whom he is 
in privity, and n1ust describe and purport to con-
vey the land in controversy.' 2 C. J. p. 17 4. 
'' 'Color of title for the purpose of adverse 
possessi,on under the statutes of limitation as to 
land is that which has the semblance or appear-
ance of title, legal or equitable, but 'vhich is in 
fact no title.'' 1 Cyc. 1082. 
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'' 'Color of title is 'that 'vhich in appearance 
is title, but 'vhich in reality is not title'; that 
'vhich seen1s and professes to convey the prop-
erty described, but for some reason do-es not do 
so.' Po"~ers Y. Kitching, note 88 Am. St. Rep. 
~o·) 
I -· 
\' \ ,,~henever an instrument by apt words of 
conveyance from grantor to grantee in fq,rm 
transfers what purports to be the title, it gives 
color of title.' '' Powers v. Kitching, note 88 
Am. St. Rep. 708 . 
.. :\Jso in that case it was held that open, notorious, 
peaceable occupation even under claim .of right is not 
sufficient. 
..._-\.uthorities are legion to the effect that mere pos-
session and occupancy, no matter how long continued, 
without a claim of right will not establish a title by 
adverse possession. Mosher v. Ari~ona Packing Com-
pany, 219 Pac. 232. 
The doctrine of adverse possession 1s to be taken 
strictly. Every presumption is in favor of a legal owner, 
and our statute, Section 104-2-7, is as follows: 
"In every action for the recovery of real 
property, or the possession thereof,. the person 
establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within 
the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the pr,operty by any other person shall be deemed 
to have been under and in subordination to the 
legal title, unless it appears that the property 
has been held and possessed adversely to such 
legal title for seven years before the commence-
ment of the action." 
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The case of 8heppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131, 
represents the vitality which this court recognizes as 
existing in that provisi.on of our statute. In that case 
the adverse claimant had not only made improvements 
but had paid taxes and had had possession for over 
twenty years, but the court permitted the real owner, 
who had an equitable title only, to establish his legal 
right to the property and disallowed the claim -of adverse 
possession by the defendant, largely up-on the basis of 
the presumption made mandatory by that provision of 
our statute. This -court used the following language in 
disallowing the claim of adverse possession in that case: 
''Moreover, when, as in this ·case, the evi-
dence justifies or requires a finding that when the 
land was purchased the title thereto was vested 
in the plaintiff, then, under our statute ( Comp . 
. Laws 1907, section 2861), the presumption pre-
vailed that the defendant's possession was 'in 
subordination of the legal title.' This presump-
tion continued until it was overcome by clear 
proof that the defendant's possession was adverse 
to such title. There is no evidence in this case 
by which it is made to appear that the defendant 
at any time repudia t.ed the title of the plaintiff 
until he did so a short time before this action 
w.as .commenced, and which re:pudiation in faJct 
was the reason why the action was commenced.'' 
Even accepting as a correct pronouncement of the 
law the quotation of Section 189 from 1 Am. Juris., page 
897-8, it will be observed that the author states that 
such occupancy and p~ossession raises a rebuttable pre-
sumption only. On · the other hand, as against that 
presumption we have the express mandate of our statute 
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that the presumption is in favor of the legal owner and 
against the claimant. 
Xow let us see \vhat the evidence showed in this 
regard. In the first place there is no evidence that 
either the plaintiff or any ~f his predecessors made any 
claim of ownership to the property prior to the filing of 
this suit in June 1937. The occupancy and the improve-
ments seem to have been transferred from one to another 
without any attempt to convey any interest in the land 
so far as the evidence shows, and it is affirmatiYely 
shown by plaintiff himself that when he went into occu-
pancy in 1919 he and his predecessors transacted the 
matter with the aid of an attorney, hut that no written 
conveyance was executed, and there was no attempt to 
convey any interest in the land. It is inconceivable that 
these parties went to an attorney merely £or the pur-
pose of having him witness the payment of some money. 
Had the predecessor claimed title to the land, and had 
the plaintiff thought that he was purchasing land when 
they went to an attorney for the purpose of consum-
mating the transaction it would have been natural that 
the transa.ction should have ~been closed with the execu-
tion of some paper or conveyance. A natural inference 
or presumption from this evidence upon the part of 
plain tiff himself is that at that time there was · no claim 
of title in the real property up,on the part of anyone. 
On the other hand there is also a fair inference to the 
effect that at that time the predecessor was claiming only 
the in1provements, and that plaintiff was purchasing only 
the improvements. In this :connection the court will 
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observe that to and including the year 19'28 the purported 
taxes paid by plaintiff were described as £ollows: ''Im-
provements on ~Clays Placer''. 
The same description was ,carried through 1929 and 
1930, although someone subsequently changed it in red 
ink to include the words '' R. E. and". Since the plain-
tiff did not pay those purported taxes in 1929 and 1930 
but on the other hand permitted the property to g.o to 
tax sale there was likewise a fair inference that this 
red ink correction was made by son1e unidentified person 
after the county had attempted to give a tax deed in 
1936. 
Be that as it may, there certainly was evidence 
from which the trial court was justified, together with 
the presumption required by Section 104-2-7 of our stat-
ute, in finding that during this entire period of time, 
and particularly up to 1936, plaintiff was making no 
claim of title to the real estate as such but was claiming 
title only to the improvements upon which he was paying 
the illegal taxes assessed by the county assessor. 
The question as to, whether plaintiff had during the 
period of time in question been occupying the premises 
under "claim of title", and as to whether during that 
period of time he was intending to occupy the premises 
as his own, was a question of fact. If the extent and 
·character of his :.nccupancy was ·suc:h as to raise a 
presumption of hostility and claim of right, on the other 
hand, the statute expressly gives a presumption the other 
way, and it was for the trial court, which had the wit-
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nesse~ before it and listened to their story, to find that 
fact, '\Yhich it did, against the plaintiff. 
1-I~re, again, up~on this issue, as upon the question of 
sufficiency of payment of taxes by plaintiff, it is not 
necessary for this court to pass upon this question in 
order to sustain the judgment of the trial court in dis-
missing' the cause of action with prejudice because of 
the fact that the uncontradicted evidence in the case 
established that plaintiff had paid no taxes lawfully 
assessed against the premises in question. 
CONCLUSION. 
The judgment of the trial court should he sustained 
and affirmed for each and all of the following reasons: 
1. Because plaintiff failed to prove that he had 
paid all taxes levied and assessed against said premises 
according to law, but on the' contrary affirmatively es-
tablished by his own evidence that the purp,orted taxes 
paid by him were not levied and assessed .according to 
law, and did not cover the particular lands and premises 
which he is now claiming, and were not assessed in the 
name of the legal owner of said premises as required 
by law. 
2. The uncontradicted ·evidence showed and estab-
lished that defendants, during the period of time in 
question, paid taxes levied and assessed against said 
premises according to law, and that said taxes paid by 
defendants ·covered both the surface and ~sub-surface or 
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mineral rights. If this is not so then plaintiff failed to 
allege and prove the negative. 
~ 
3. That the occupancy by plaintiff of said lands 
and premises was without claim of title and in subor-
dination to the rights of possession of defendants. 
Either one or all.o.f the foregoing propositions found 
in favor of the .a:ction .of the trial eourt is sufficient to 
sustain the decision and judgment dismissing plaintiff's 
cause of action with prejudice. 
We respeetfully submit the judgment of the trial 
court should accordingly he affirmed. 
RrcH, RicH & STRONG, 
Attorneys for Respondent' 
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